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The Phenomenological Immediacy 
and its Structure
The present contribution moves from one of the main issues of Severino’s The Original
structure, namely, the relation of co-implication between phenomenological and logical
immediacy. In their structural relationship, these two meanings of immediacy constitute the
original structure of the appearance of being (ens). This structure is characterized by a
complex unity, which is articulated into three moments, indicating that something only
appears if its appearance appears. The proposal of the present work consists in a
comparison of Severino’s position with a classical structure of evidence and implication such
as that of the transcendental, which is here conceived in a Kantian sense, namely, as the
place of the a priori conditions according to which the data enter the subject’s horizon.
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First Part - ON THE ORIGINAL STRUCTURE
1. Introduction
The presentation of the original structure is equal to the individuation of the
essence of ground, that is, the anapodictic structure of knowledge or,
alternatively, the dynamic by means of which the multiplicity structurally
becomes principiality or immediacy (Severino, 19812, p. 107).
The original structure (La struttura originaria) begins with a formal
definition which represents, however, the aim of determining what
characterises the immediacy and, then, the experience as such. 
The notion of immediacy explicitly refers to the empirical given.
Nevertheless, this notion has to be distinguished from the empirical given;
on the one hand, it certainly refers to the appearance of the given, on the
other, it states that the appearance of the given cannot be denied. And, of
course, the latter feature is not included at all into the empirical given.
Now, these two moments – the phenomenological and logical immediacy
– are concretely unified thus constituting the experience of being. From this
point of view, both the empirical data and their twofold evidence are secured.
Since this original structure names the ground, the ground is already
efficacious in the dynamics in which the phenomenological and logical
immediacy are intertwined. This originary-ness has, as a content, the totality
of the experience and it is identical to the unity of the experience; however,
from a formal point of view, it is identical to the whole being. This is, in a
nutshell, the theoretical path we would like to follow.
A first consideration concerns the role of philosophy that, as a
manifestation of being as such, is phenomenology, not only as the
appearance of something to the subject but also as a manifestation of being
in its necessity. Here, we deal with the first stage of the structure of the
philosophical understanding given as the synthesis of phenomenology and
logic: two distinct constituents that are, however, concretely unified.
It means that a phenomenological given is not what simply shows itself
within the horizon of the appearance, but it is what is never separated from
the logos: “The immediacy of the nexus between the meanings ( = meaningful
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things = the fact that things mean = beings) is put as ‘logical’ immediacy
(since the logicality, the logos, is the relationship between meanings) and the
immediacy of the logicality is called ‘law of noncontradiction’. The
immediacy of the evidence, that is, the appearance of the various forms of
nexuses which hold together the meanings, is called ‘phenomenological’
immediacy” (Severino, 19812, p. 17).
In the definition of the content of knowledge, intended as synthesis of the
phenomenological and logical appearing, we face a specific notion of truth:
truth is construed as the immediate and, from a structural point of view, the
anapodictical structure of knowledge leads to the immediate without any
mediation. 
For such reason, the problem of non-truth arises: non-truth is precisely
the separation of these two indivisible dimensions.
Given that, the original structure is not something which in turn needs
to be grounded by something else; on the contrary, it is itself the essence of
ground and, therefore, it belongs to the anapodictic understanding, which
does not require any demonstration. The structure, in other terms, appears
to be an incontrovertible self-manifestation. Along with the first –
immediate, original and phenomenological – manifestation, it appears the
logos too, that is, the principle of the incontrovertibility. The original
structure exhibits both the poles of its own immediacy. But what does it
mean to maintain that the immediacy is twofold (phenomenological and
logical)? What does it mean that in the self-revealing of the being the
dimension of the incontrovertibility also comes up and that these two
moments together constitute the original structure?
Here, we state that the appearance of everything that immediately
appears, entails the presence of the logos too. Therefore, we have the
following consequences: first, the original judgement is not only the
expression of a methodology but it expresses at the same time also a content,
that is, a being with all its determinations. Second, the truth of the original
structure does not deny the plurality of the determinations but it shows the
identity, within the original judgement, of subject and predicate. It does not
take for granted something of immediately known which, without the
phenomenological-logical interweaving, would be only seemingly known. 
That said, we can reach a conclusion already implicit in the occurring
terms. The immediacy is a structure which includes phenomenological and
logical immediacy. These cannot be intended as successive and distinct
moments but as items originally in relation. For this reason, the original
structure is the necessity between the semantic fields, both as immediacy of
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the evidence of the appearance and as logical relationship between the
meanings.
Therefore, if the logical immediacy consists in the non-contradiction of
being as such (taken in its totality), the phenomenological immediacy is
defined by Severino as “immediacy of the appearing of being that appears,
inasmuch being which appears, that is, the appearing of any being that
appears, that is the appearing of the totality of being which appears”
(Severino, 19812, p. 34).
It means that every being is always within the concrete original structure
and, therefore, the two regions of the immediacy are characterised by an
effective and specific self-exhibition. In any case, everything originally
appearing, appears both as a being and as the necessary relation among
beings. It is straightforward to identify the relationship between the two
levels with the logical dimension of the original; however, since this
relationship exists, it must be said that it belongs to the phenomenological
level too.
2. Phenomenological immediacy and the structure of the appearing
On the basis of such premises, the phenomenological immediacy cannot be
understood simply as the immediate appearing of beings. It is, more
radically, an appearing of nexuses where the form of appearing includes not
only the beings but also the beings which constitute the various relations. At
the same time, the immediacy includes, then, the co-originary-ness of the
two regions of the immediacy. 
In order for a being to appear, there must be, at the same time, the whole
class of the nexuses by means of which any being is necessarily and formally
included into a relation. The empirical appearing of any given, of any being,
of any state of affairs, is within a horizon which is original and it always
remains as such: if something is, it is undeniable that it appears within this
structural entanglement of relationships. This class of nexuses is the original
grounding, without which any being cannot access into the horizon of the
appearing.
This clarification allows us to say that the subject-object dualism, which
characterised modern philosophy, is solved and, at the same time,
overcome. It is solved because this class of nexuses immediately appears in
its own undeniability, in its necessity; therefore, it is not the effect of the
relation between subject and object, but it is the undeniable remaining of
the identity among being-knowing-meaning. It is overcome as a veritable
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horizon, since the original truth of being does not depend on the
intentional act but it shows itself as original opposition to its own negation.
How is the phenomenological immediacy, that is, the appearing being
exhibited? In order for something to be able to self-manifest, no operating
presupposition is supposed to be. So, what reveals itself, by excluding a
presupposition, is undeniable. The immediacy is, then, another way to
characterise the manifestation; the structure of the immediate refers to the
totality which belongs to such level of manifestation. This is an undeniable
nexus and, therefore, the structure of the genuine appearing coincides with
the structure of the immediacy. 
The presence of being does not presuppose anything but itself: “The
being which is immediately present – the ‘immediate’ as what it occurs into
the constitution of the subject of the original judgement or, better, as
element of that structure of the senses of the immediacy which constitute the
subject of the original subject – is what, in order to be affirmed, does not
require (or not presuppose) anything but itself: τὸ δι᾽αὐτὸ γνώριμον: per se
notum”( Severino, 19812, p. 143).
It is worth to note that this passage clearly distinguishes the presence of
being and the presence of what is present. However, here it is simply stated
that being as per se notum means that one knows that the being is; in other
terms, being states the phenomenological immediacy of a nexus. A further
step is required; and it is specified in the following: “When we claim: the
being is, since the fact that the being is, is per se notum, this ‘since’ (the
grounding) is not in this case the reason of being of the being (it is not the
since of the connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition:
‘The being is’), but it is the ‘since’ of the that-being (dass): phenomenological
immediacy” (Severino, 19812, p. 145).
The appearing has therefore a content (hyposyntax) and it is at the same
time the horizon in which the being appears (hypersyntax). As background,
the structure is original and as unity of a multiplicity, it is a
phenomenological and logical complex constituted by determinations
related to each other. The determinations are just within the complex and the
complex is a unity of a plurality of determinations. The grounding is the
impossibility of not-being, immediately appearing without the mediation of
anything else: the ground, in order to be ground, must be original and it is
original only because it is a structure.
Now, thought is the manifestation of being; this presence of being –
which is known in itself – is understood in an immediate way and cannot be
subjected to negation. Otherwise, the presence of being would keep close the
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not-being intended as not-removed; in other terms, the affirmation of being
would not entail its negation to be removed. The negation is actually
removed by considering that the affirmation of being does not require any
proof or demonstration. The deep meaning of immediacy actually excludes
the possibility of a non-being together with being. Namely, it means that the
statement “being is” does not need any demonstration: “Greek philosophy
has the priceless merit to reveal the sense of immediacy. This revealing is not
something secondary with respect to the immediacy, but is precisely what
makes immediacy valuable as grounding. The immediacy is either grounding
inasmuch it is revealed or it is posed as immediacy” (Severino, 19812, p. 147).
(In this way the difference from Gustavo Bontadini becomes clear: only
by eliminating the great contradiction and maintaining the work of the
principle of creation’s immobility, philosophy develops and cancels the
ongoing contingent determinations. The paths of knowing diverge. And yet,
Severino grasps the original structure within the same framework, singling
out from contemporary philosophy the conditions to overcome the typical
of modern phylosophy’s oblivion of the classic, metaphysical thinking.)
Here, one can appreciate the unique function of the phenomenological
immediacy since it amounts to the very manifestation of being. However,
saying that being is – that is, stating its being given with any chance to negate
it – depends on the phenomenology and it is certified by the logos. At this
point, the statement “being is” amounts to “it is true that being is, it
appears.” Given this distinction, one can maintain that the
phenomenological and logical immediacy constitute a structure, the original
structure of the appearing: the appearing of these entities can be affirmed
only if its appearing has been affirmed. Again: the appearing of the appearing
can be affirmed only if its appearing is affirmed. As the structure is a
compound of immediacies, so the appearing is a complex unity, a being
which is and which denies to not be. The phenomenological moment is
already present in the logical moment.
For that, the structure of the appearing is articulated into three levels
which constitute the complex unity of the appearing: the appearing of the
appearing of the appearing. The three levels mean that something appears
only if its appearing appears. The aporia stems from that: on one hand the
appearing of being belongs to the necessity, on the other it is ungrounded
since it chases the necessity without reaching it.
How to avoid the aporia? The proposed solution is the following: “The
totality of the appearing being originally includes its own appearing (i.e.
originally includes that being that is its own appearing), so that the position
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of the appearing of the being that appears is originally a position of the
appearing of such appearing (position of auto-appearing); in other words,
the affirmation of the existence of the appearing does not have to look for its
grounding in the affirmation of the existence of an appearing (a’) of the
appearing (a), where the a’ appearing is different from a appearing of the
being. The appearing (a) of the being is, originally, at the same time
appearing of itself, and consequently it does not have to endlessly chase its
own Necessity” (Severino, 19812, p. 65).
That requires an explanation of the notions of reflexivity and
completeness. The three levels do not mean that the reflection adds to the
appearing another appearing; neither it holds the objection that the
appearing of the appearing would trigger an infinite regress.
In the first place, if an empirical given is evident, then being appears
inasmuch its own appearing appears; in other words, the immediacy of the
given is not simple but it belongs to a structured appearing: it always shows
a reflexivity. The appearing of being entails the appearing of its appearing.
Secondly, the threefold appearing does not go on endlessly since the three
levels constitute an identity. We face a complete evidence of immediacy: the
immediacy of a given entails the being self of the given. This immediacy
excludes the non correspondence between being and being immediate;
therefore, a given is immediate in every time and with reference to itself.
The phenomenological immediacy concretely discloses the structure of
the immediate presence of being: it is the already cited threefold appearing
structure. This allows to state that the appearing does not concern only the
things (the appearing of things) but, more significantly, it is the appearing of
the appearing of the things: it is the self-appearing. Therefore, the thought
not only is directed towards the manifested things, but it is itself a content
which appears. Every content of the appearing of the phenomenological
immediacy is, therefore, incontrovertible.
3. A possible analogy: the notion of transcendental
The analysis of the structure allows for a great quantity of references to the
history of philosophy; Severino exploits those works in order to clarify his
view and to distinguish it from the others available, for instance, the explicit
references to Hegel. 
Let us take the following juxtaposition: the appearing is already appearing
of the appearing of the appearing as well as the consciousness is already
consciousness of the self-consciousness (Severino, 19812, p. 92). As a matter
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of fact, the latter formula allows a better understanding of the former. 
I would like to provide another analogy, concerning the classical structure
of evidence and entailment: the notion of transcendental. It is worth
noticing that, even in this case, there is no equivalence of arguments
(Severino would not accept that) but a sort of affinity between discourses.
The term “transcendental” is not intended by Severino as a transgeneric
notion, that is, the universal which is in any particular. Transcendental is the
horizon within which the appearing of all beings appears and the
transcendental Ego is the appearing which is conscious that the beings are.
In a first sense, this transcendental appearing is obviously distinct from
the empirical appearing of the individual determinations. But there is a
second way in which the appearing is transcendental: a given is included in
knowledge only if one can exhibit at the same time its condition of
possibility; analogously, a given is immediate only if it is included in an
immediacy which is necessary. The appearing of beings is within a
transcendental and total appearing where beings are forever, they do not
begin or stop appearing. Here transcendental coincides with the original and
necessary horizon in which any being is. Without this relationship, no entity
could appear. 
One could propose a different, alternative, argument. The transcendental
structure indicates everything that is condition of the possibility of the
knowledge and together the knowledge of this condition. What is considered
as condition is, doubtlessly, identifiable (at least for Kant) as an a priori form.
Nevertheless, it could be construed in more general terms: in every act of
knowledge the totality of experience and its undeniability about the
individual state of affairs which appears within the totality is entailed (as its
condition). It is a sort of ontological amplification of the transcendental
structure which extends and modifies the point of view. Here, the suggestion
has a pure heuristic character, but it is useful to take into account two
exemplifications, one historical and the other theoretical.
Preliminarily, it is useful to investigate whether the notion of
transcendental can be read as the necessary reference of a given (i.e.: an
empirical intuition, a state of affairs) to an undeniable horizon in which there
is the experience of given. This proposal can be expressed also in Kantian
terminology. Let us think about, for instance, the notion of “system” which
is the connection of known propositions grounded in a unique principle in
order to exclude bunches of known propositions simply aggregated. But a
system is not only “the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea”
(Kant, KrV: B 860, tr. 1998, p. 691). Moreover, a system can guarantee the
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existence of the totality. The concept of system is, therefore, structural and it
does not concern solely the knowledge, but also reality. Kant’s example is
illuminating: the system is akin to an “animal body” – “whose growth does
not add a limb but rather makes each limb stronger and fitter for its end”
(Kant, KrV: B 861, tr. 1998, p. 691).
The analogy with the living world suggests that a system must be alive in
order to guarantee its own unity; and, by consequence, “the entire system of
metaphysics” (Kant, KrV: B 874, tr. 1998, p. 699) is alive since it wants to
achieve the essential aims of the reason. The system of metaphysics is an
articulated system, not a heap of unconnected parts. The metaphysics is such
not because its proper objects are beyond the experience, but because it
represents a system that foreknows both “the interconnection [of cognition]
based on one principle” (Kant, KrV: B 673, tr. 1998, p. 591), and all the
possible objects of experience. Thus, the system denotes an object and, at the
same time, its unconditional possibility, that is, its belonging to a given unity
of meaning. Reason is the faculty of the unconditional because by gathering
everything in a totality, it does not confine itself to the knowledge of what is
given, but it pre-empts the unity of a fundamental connection, that is, the
“systematic completeness of all cognition” (Kant, KrV: B 683, tr. 1998, p.
597) of the objects of the experience.
4. Final remarks: the implications of the transcendental reading
But the historical link to Kant does not exclude a further theoretical in-depth
analysis, instead it requires it. One can ask under what conditions an given
appearing is also the content of a transcendental knowledge. It must be that
the given is the content of an evidence, that is, a given which appears within
the horizon of appearing and, moreover, that evidence is necessary. The
transcendental structure is the horizon in which something appears and, at
the same time, it entails that what is within the appearing must necessarily
appear. The transcendental is the immediate which entails the being present
as necessary and at the same time the presentness of what is necessary
present. 
The given which appears in the transcendental structure is known as
immediately necessary and therefore the transcendental is a necessarily
immediate condition. 
The transcendental is, sure, a condition of possibility of the knowledge
but it is also the necessary and incontrovertible knowledge of that very
condition. At the end of the day, a structure can be said transcendental in so
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far as it allows the appearing of the given and its necessity. In that way, the
excess of a content about the structure is excluded since every content of the
experience appears only within the horizon of presentness which cannot be
overcome, since it is the unity of the experience. 
In sum, nothing can be given without and beyond the horizon of the
transcendental structure, which unconditionally appears. Every being is not
contradictory in its appearing and its appearing too is not contradictory.
Nevertheless, the transcendental operates by means of categories and, among
them, the modal ones. Here the relation between the given which appears
and the subject to which the multiplicity appears is not univocal. “Finally,
necessity is nothing other than the existence [Existenz] that is given by
possibility itself ” (Kant, KrV: B 111, tr. 1998, p. 215). The transcendental
argument could lead, here, to other solutions. Thus, Severino’s philosophy
seems to be already outlined from the very beginning of his reflection: “This
complicated historic and theoretic development of the philosophical
thinking is far from being summed up in a simple act; instead, it needs a
movement of adjustment and clarification throughout the time, where what
has to be potentially remembered – the classic metaphysics – could be
usefully presented in multiple ways that manage to grasp, from different
perspectives, its truth. A sort of surveys and probing investigations then take
place, which positively contribute to such adjustment, thus leading to the
complete illumination of the truth. The following reflections have to take
into account such contribution. The investigation is basically constituted by
a deduction of the structure of being, by the determination of the deducted
structure and by the shift from deduction to determination” (Severino,
1950, p. 385).
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